



the Health Care Sector
Alexandre Morais Nunes1,2,
Diogo Cunha Ferreira2 and
Adalberto Campos Fernandes3
Abstract
Portugal has faced an economic and financial crisis that began circa FY2009 and
whose effects are still ongoing. In FY2011, the Portuguese state and the European
triumvirate – composed of the European Commission, the International Monetary
Fund, and the European Central Bank – signed the Memoranda of Understanding.
This troika agreement aimed to improve the operational efficiency of public services.
This crisis had a considerable impact on the Portuguese citizens’ life and productivity,
as well as on the public health care system. Cuts over public expenditures have been
made to reduce the risk of noncompliance with budgetary targets, despite their
potential impact on quality and access to health care services. We analyzed the
main policies and measures undertaken by the Portuguese Ministry of Health with
respect to the bailout program associated with the troika agreement. Then, we
focused on the budgetary cuts–related risks over the social performance of the
care system. Evidence suggests that structural reforms in the health care sector in
the troika period had positive effects in terms of drugs administration and consump-
tion, on the one hand, and secondary care expenditures reduction, on the other
hand. Nonetheless, we observed some divestitures on infrastructures and the wors-
ening of access to health care services.
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Key Messages
• The effects of the financial crisis in the Portuguese public health care sector
were evaluated.
• This study analyzed the main responses given by the Portuguese health care
system to the bailout program, focusing on budgetary cuts–related risks over
the social performance of the care system.
• Evidence suggests that structural reforms in the health care sector in that
period had positive effects in terms of both medicines administration and
consumption and secondary care expenditures reduction.
• Nonetheless, divestitures on equipment and infrastructures, as well as the
decreasing of access to health care, were also observed.
Introduction
The Portuguese National Health Service (NHS) delivers universal, equitable,
general, and tendentiously free health care services to all citizens.1 Planning,
organizing, and regulating the health care sector is carried out centrally by
the Ministry of Health and, at the regional level, by 5 regional health admin-
istrations (RHA; in Portuguese: Administrac¸~oes Regionais de Saude, ARS):
North, Center, Lisbon and Tagus Valley, Alentejo, and Algarve.2 Each RHA
has an administrative council, which manages the delivered health care services,
ensures the coordination between the public and the private sectors as well as the
timely provision of health care to the patients, supervises and controls secondary
care providers (hospitals), and, finally, administers and participates in the
annual financing process carried out for each primary health care center.2
Besides the NHS, the Portuguese health sector is composed of private vol-
untary insurance (PVI) and a set of health care subsystems: special public and
private insurance schemes associated with some professions (20%–25%).3,4
In Portugal, health care providers can be either public (primary health care
centers and hospitals) or private.5 Public hospitals and primary health care
centers are under the supervision and jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health.
Private health care providers are mainly clinics and hospitals. These private
providers are associated with the delivery of clinical material and pharmaceuti-
cal products, with complementary diagnostic and therapeutic services, and with
the provision of specialty medical appointments.
The financing of the health care system in Portugal is mainly public, and
funds are collected via taxation,4 as usual in Beveridge-like systems.
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As mentioned in the Physicians for a National Health Program (http://www.
pnhp.org/single_payer_resources/health_care_systems_four_basic_models.php),
“in this system [Beveridge], health care is provided and financed by the govern-
ment through tax payments [ . . . ]. Many, but not all, hospitals and clinics are
owned by the government; some doctors are government employees, but there are
also private doctors who collect their fees from the government.” The Portuguese
NHS follows the Britain’s one, as both are Beveridge systems. Nevertheless, a
significant share of total financing is private and includes co-payments, subsys-
tems, and PVIs that are voluntary, competitive, and excludable services.
Whereas subsystems cover nearly a quarter of all Portuguese citizens (in
FY2016), that share reduces to 20% in the case of PVIs.4 In FY2016, about
61% of health care services were financed through public sources, and 29%
resulted from co-payments (or moderating fees).7 In the same year, health
care expenses represented about 9% of the Portuguese gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP).6,7
The financial crisis began in FY2009, according to the technical definition of
recessions (2 quarters of negative growth).46 This crisis had a meaningful impact
in the Portuguese economy, because of the global recession of worldwide econ-
omies. Between FY2010 and FY2011, the Portuguese GDP decreased nearly
4.4%, which compares with the average GDP evolution of EU28: 2.9% in
the same period.6 In FY2011, the Portuguese state and the European triumvirate
– composed of the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund,
and the European Central Bank – signed the Memoranda of Understanding.
These memoranda consisted of 3 main documents: the Memorandum
of Economic and Financial Policies, the Technical Memorandum of
Understanding, and the Memorandum of Understanding on Specific
Economic Policy Conditionality (hereinafter, MoU). These 3 documents are
commonly known as the “troika agreement.”
After intervention (by December FY2015), the Portuguese GDP rose almost
3%, which was above the EU28 average: 0.7%.6 Although the Portuguese
public budget deficit (difference between expenditures and revenues) had
evolved from e14,278 million to e5,606 million, this one remained excessive-
ly large and led to a substantial increase of the public debt. This debt was fixed
into 129% of GDP in the after-crisis period.8
Austerity-based policies included in the troika agreement9 also introduced a
set of measures to reduce costs and waste in the health system, to improve its
efficiency, to increase the regulation of the pharmaceutical market, and to
enhance the hospitals’ management, by reducing contracted budgets with
these entities.5,10 Hence, between FY2011 and FY2015, the average household
disposable income has decreased, whereas the NHS co-payments have
increased.11 Henceforward, the access to the NHS and to the appropriate
health care services was theoretically worsened within the troika period.
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This study analyzes some of the most important macroeconomic indicators,
the existing evidence in official published reports, and the main health policies
implemented in the period of troika agreement (FY2011–FY2015). We intend to
provide a deep thought about both past and ongoing health policies to recover
the Portuguese NHS and to improve the access of citizens to the appropriate
and timely health care services. Additionally, we conduct an econometric anal-
ysis to investigate the evolution of hospitals’ performance between FY2013
and FY2016 and to complement the theoretical analysis. Such an econometric
exercise is based on robust nonparametric benchmarking methods linked to an
augmented Hicks-Moorsteen Index, which was recently proved to be a true
total factor productivity index. It can decompose the performance evolution
of hospitals on their efficiency growth, their productivity change (technological
evolution), and their approach to or departure from the optimal scale.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section “Health Care
Expenditures and Financing Public Providers in Portugal” describes the evolu-
tion of expenditures with health care and the financing of public providers in
Portugal. Section “Health Policies and the Memoranda of Understanding”
describes the main health policies undertaken in the troika agreement period.
Section “The Application of Austerity Measures and Their Effects in the Health
Sector” identifies the main outcomes resulting from the austerity measures.
Section “An Econometric Analysis” details and applies some
econometric techniques to study the Portuguese public hospitals’ performance
evolution between FY2013 and FY2016. Section “Current Policies to Retrieve the
National Health Service” describes some health policies introduced by the current
government to overcome some of the identified outcomes resulting from the aus-
terity period. Section “Conclusions” concludes this document.
Health Care Expenditures and Financing Public
Providers in Portugal
The public health care system is a Beveridge system like the one existing in
Britain and Spain. The Ministry of Health receives a share of the general
state budget resulting from taxation of citizens and companies. That budget
share is then distributed to all public institutions belonging to the NHS, accord-
ing to their past expenditures and production (volume of delivered services).12
Such a process requires a contracting mechanism between each public entity and
its corresponding RHA.13 For instance, the hospitals’ contracted budget
requires the prospecting of the diagnostic-related groups-based activity, as
well as a set of service-specific prices. These prices are defined by clustering
hospitals according to a set of size- and complexity-related variables, finding
the most efficient hospitals within each cluster, and assessing their associated
unitary costs.
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The evolution of expenses with health care in the past few years has been
associated with an attempt to control the public share of those expenditures, in
an efficient and effective way. This attempt has tried to reduce public resources’
waste, deficits, and cumulative debts in hospitals.5 Since FY2002 and until the
troika agreement (FY2011), some of those attempts included the corporatiza-
tion and merging (either vertical or horizontal) of public hospitals,14,15 the intro-
duction of contracts between health care providers and the statutory
monopsony, and the introduction of the public-private partnership concept in
the (secondary) health care sector.16 A detailed identification and description of
such policies (attempts) can be found in Nunes and Ferreira.48 Despite those
measures and according to these authors, cost containment was not effective
because the deficit in the public health sector tended to increase, and the objec-
tive of reducing expenses per medical act (or per patient) was not achieved.
Tables 1 and 2 show the growth of the Portuguese public and private expen-
ditures in health care, as well as the financing and deficit of the NHS, for the
period FY2002–FY2016. Figure 1 compares the evolution of GDP and public
expenditures in health care for the same period. Between FY2002 and FY2010,
public expenditures in health care increased about e385 million per year, which
corresponds to a rate of 4.8% per year. The overall deficit in the public health
care sector was approximately e1,330 million due to the accumulation of neg-
ative budgetary balances over the 8 years. Although the exact date cannot be
precisely defined, the financial crisis in Portugal began circa FY2009. More than
e12,119 million were available for health care in that year, or equivalently
e1,148 per capita. From that budget, about 3 quarters (e8,900 million) were
attributed to the Portuguese NHS. In FY2011, the public expenses grew 5.3%,
settling into e9,400 million, corroborating the hypothesis of public health
underfunding.
Unlike public expenditures in health care, private expenditures had an overall
increase of more than 59% in the 8-year period FY2002–FY2010. During those
8 years, the average annual increase of private expenditures in health care was
equal to 5.49% (e221.6 million per year).
The most recent MoU in Portugal was signed in FY2011. In view of that, the
financing of health care, either public or private, suffered a considerable reduc-
tion between FY2011 and FY2015 (see Table 2). The public expenditures were
yearly reduced by e140 million (2.7%), on average. It contrasts with the evo-
lution of GDP within the same period (see Figure 1) and of public expenses in
health care in the preceding 8-year period. Within FY2011–FY2015, the NHS
cumulative deficit decreased due to injections of capital.
The troika agreement ended in December FY2015. In that year, more than
e10.5 billion were available for the health care services (e1,029.6 per capita).
From that budget, about 83% was attributed to the NHS. Nonetheless,
expenses from the NHS grew 7.6% in that year, to e9 billion, highlighting the
public health sector underfunding (see Table 2).
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Private expenses in health care decreased annually by e127 million (–2.3%),
between FY2011 and FY2014. This fact reveals a change in the trend in the
previous 8-year period. By FY2015, such expenditures grew 2.7% when com-
pared with FY2014 but only 0.3% compared to FY2011. This behavior of pri-
vate health care expenses may reveal the effects of the financial crisis, namely in
what concerns the available household income’s considerable reduction. It jeop-
ardizes the access to the private care sector and the willingness for co-payments.
Table 1. Public and Private Expenditures in the Health Care Sector in Portugal
(FY2002–FY2010).
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Public health care
expenditures
8,860 9,238 10,059 10,666 10,500 10,930 11,440 12,119 12,327
Annual
increase (%)
9.60 4.30 8.90 6.00 1.60 4.10 4.70 5.90 1.70
GDP (%) 6.20 6.30 6.60 6.70 6.30 6.20 6.40 6.90 6.90
NHS health care
expenditures
7,067 6,858 7,632 8,033 7,888 8,132 8,456 8,925 9,399
Annual
increase (%)
6.80 3.00 11.30 5.30 1.80 3.10 4.00 5.50 5.30
GDP (%) 5.00 4.70 5.00 5.10 4.70 4.60 4.70 5.10 5.20
NHS financing 6,919 6,402 6,799 8,221 8,217 8,241 8,322 8,709 9,187
Annual
increase (%)
23.30 7.50 6.20 20.90 0.04 0.30 1.00 4.60 5.50
NHS deficita 148 456 832 188 329 109 134 217 213
Annual
increase (%)
84.80 207.70 82.70 122.60 75.30 66.90 223.00 61.50 1.90
Funding (%) 2.10 7.10 12.20 2.30 4.00 1.30 1.60 2.50 2.30
Private health care
expenditure
3,346 3,772 4,105 4,300 4,688 4,977 5,289 5,213 5,341
Annual
increase (%)
0.50 12.70 8.80 4.80 9.00 6.20 6.30 1.40 2.50
GDP (%) 2.30 2.60 2.70 2.70 2.80 2.80 3.00 3.00 3.00
Total health care
expenditures
12,206 13,010 14,164 14,966 15,189 15,909 16,729 17,332 17,668
Annual
increase (%)
6.90 6.60 8.90 5.70 1.50 4.70 5.20 3.60 1.90
GDP (%) 8.60 8.90 9.30 9.40 9.10 9.10 9.40 9.90 9.80
Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estatıstica (2010), Direc¸~ao-Geral do Orc¸amento – Sıntese de Execuc¸~ao
Orc¸amental (2002–2010). Expenditures were expressed in million euros.
Abbreviations: GDP, gross domestic product; NHS, National Health Service.
aNHS Deficit¼NHS Financing – NHS health care expenditures.
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Table 2. Public and Private Expenditures in the Health Care Sector in Portugal
(FY2011–FY2016).
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Public health care expenditures 11,366 10,322 10,357 10,319 10,665 10,960
Annual increase (%) 7.80 9.20 0.30 0.40 3.40 2.80
GDP (%) 6.50 6.10 6.10 6.00 5.90 5.90
NHS health care expenditures 8,854 8,263 8,333 8,385 9,025 9,131
Annual increase (%) 5.80 6.70 0.80 0.60 7.60 1.20
GDP (%) 5.00 4.90 4.90 4.80 5.00 4.90
NHS financing 8,581 10,142 8,353 8,177 8,654 8,932
Annual increase (%) 6.60 18.20 17.60 2.10 5.80 3.20
NHS Deficita 273 1879 21 208 372 199
Annual increase (%) 28.20 789.50 98.90 1103.90 78.90 46.40
Funding (%) 3.20 18.50 0.20 2.50 4.30 2.20
Private health care expenditure 5,424 5,420 5,119 5,297 5,441 5,585
Annual increase (%) 1.60 0.10 5.60 3.50 2.70 2.60
GDP (%) 3.10 3.20 3.00 3.10 3.00 3.00
Total health care expenditures 16,791 15,742 15,477 15,616 16,106 16,545
Annual increase (%) 5.00 6.20 1.70 0.90 3.10 2.70
GDP (%) 9.50 9.30 9.10 9.00 9.00 8.90
Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estatıstica (2017), Direc¸~ao-Geral do Orc¸amento – Sıntese de Execuc¸~ao
Orc¸amental (2002–2016). Expenditures are expressed in million euros.
Abbreviations: GDP, gross domestic product; NHS, National Health Service.
aNHS Deficit¼NHS FinancingNHS health care expenditures.
Figure 1. Evolution of GDP and public health care expenditures/GDP ratio
(FY2002–FY2016). Adapted from Instituto Nacional de Estatıstica (2010), Direc¸~ao-Geral do
Orc¸amento – Sıntese de Execuc¸~ao Orc¸amental (2002–2016). Abbreviations: GDP, gross
domestic product.
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In FY2016, the Portuguese government introduced some health policies to
reduce the NHS deficit and to increase its overall budget when compared with
the austerity period. As a result, the public expenses with health care grew 2.8%
compared to FY2015, keeping the same share of GDP (see Figure 1). The NHS
financing grew 3.2%, and its deficit decreased 2.2%. Furthermore, the private
expenses with health care grew 2.6% (see Table 2).
Health Policies and the Memoranda of Understanding
The MoU dictated the beginning of a set of austerity-related policies and struc-
tural measures to mitigate the impact of the crisis in public finances. The MoU
detailed the general conditions of economic policy as embodied in the Council
Execution Decision on granting of financial resources for assistance to Portugal.
This decision specified that the first financial disbursement by the European
Financial Stabilization Mechanism would be released with the MoU’s entry
into force. Subsequently, the council decision subjected the release of additional
tranches based on quarterly reviews of the results achieved (progresses made)
that took place during the troika period.9
Several reforms in the health care sector were included in the program
for both central and regional governments to control and reduce expenditures,
to mitigate waste, and to improve efficiency and effectiveness of health
care providers.
Regarding the health care system financing, MoU-based policies reviewed
and increased the moderating fees paid by citizens to the NHS providers. For
instance, co-payments for primary care medical appointments changed from
e2.25 to e5.00, whereas the tariff for an emergency visit to hospital rose from
e9.60 to e20.00. Those policies also decreased the number of categories of
citizens exempt from paying user fees, the contribution for nonemergency
patients’ transportation,10,11 and the tax deductions on health costs. Finally,
those austerity measures promoted the self-financing of public health subsys-
tems that no longer have access to public funds.4
MoU-based policies in the health sector also intervened at the level of drugs
and pharmaceutical products. There was a review of the reference prices and
tariffs, an imposition of ceiling prices for generic drugs, the reduction of entry
barriers into the pharma market, the creation of compulsory electronic
medicines prescription (to improve their monitoring), and the imposition of
maximum profit margins for drugstores. In addition, the Portuguese govern-
ment established a ceiling for costs associated with the pharmaceutical industry
(roughly f2 billion).9
The following were measures adopted to promote efficiency in the health care
system. First, the Ministry of Health implemented a centralized purchasing and
supply system for drugs and medical devices used by the NHS providers. It is
under the supervision of a specialized entity – Shared Services of the Ministry of
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Health (SSMH). Second, a code system and a common register for medical
devices supplies by both the SSMH and the National Authority for Medicines
and Health Products (INFARMED) were developed. Third, the capacity of the
NHS was augmented, e.g., through increasing the number of beds. This measure
was intended to reduce the use of the private sector. Fourth, prices paid by the
NHS to the private sector for complementary diagnostics and therapeutics were
revised and reduced.9
To enhance efficiency within the health sector, the MoU also imposed meas-
ures to control the expenditures of public hospitals. First, a schedule for paying
arrears to domestic suppliers and an audit system were implemented.
Transparency for appointing the board of directors was improved. This
appointment should be based on merit, experience, and know-how. Some
benchmarking reports based on access, quality, and efficiency indicators were
developed, also contributing to improvement of transparency. The cooperation
and integration of different technology and information systems for manage-
ment data consultation in real time were settled. A human resources inventory
per hospital and per medical specialty to assess current and future needs was
introduced. Also, regarding clinical staff, some mobility rules were created and
implemented.9
At the primary care level, only a few measures were imposed, aiming to
mitigate needless access to secondary care (emergencies and specialty appoint-
ments). For that reason, the so-called Family Health Units were created.
These entities are composed of teams of clinical staff, and their outcomes
(improvement of the patients’ well-being) are evaluated and rewarded, should
they meet the goals predefined in contracts. Furthermore, general practitioners
were incentivised to move to depopulated and deprived geographic areas
(countryside) to reduce disparities in access to primary care services.
The Application of Austerity Measures and Their Effects in
the Health Sector
Financial crises usually raise a number of serious concerns. Several authors refer
to some adverse effects, including the loss of employment; the greater difficulty
of entering the labor market;17,18 the risk of malnutrition; the increased mental
disorders, alcohol consumption, and suicide;19,20 the poorer health protection;
and the higher incidence of diseases.10 Other authors, however, point out that
these crises may have a greater influence on high-risk groups, such as elderly,47
people living alone, immigrants, single mothers, and low-income people.10,19,44
Hence, it is compulsory that, in a period of public funding constraints, the
effects of the crisis should be monitored by health authorities. Also, access to
health care services should always be ensured, especially for the high-risk groups
of citizens.
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According to the Portuguese National Institute of Statistics, by the end
of FY2011 (when the financial aiding program took place), the income
of nearly 42.5% of the Portuguese citizens was smaller than or equal to the
so-called poverty threshold (whereas the average of EU28 was about 44%).
Between FY2012 and FY2015, that level rose 5.3% in Portugal. About a fifth
of those citizens were living under severe conditions of material deprivation.21,22
In FY2016, the dimension of that group reduced to levels close to FY2011,
whereas the population living near the poverty line has kept nearly unchanged:
46.1%.21,22 Regarding FY2017, Statistics Portugal has foreseen a small decrease
to 6.9% (1.2%) of the population living in severe conditions of material dep-
rivation. This prediction anticipates the economic recovery from the troika
agreement period and the Portuguese economic growth after the exit of the
procedure for excessive deficit. Even so, and compared to EU28, Portugal still
exhibits the fourth highest level of citizens at risk of poverty. Above Portugal,
we can find Hungary (49.1%), Romania (49.5%), and Greece (52.9%).21
Evaluating the financial crisis effects in health care and public health is difficult
in the short run because epidemiological and morbidity and mortality data have,
in general, a latency period of 2 up to 5 years.23 That is, the effects of the financial
crisis whose financial aid program ended by December FY2015 are still ongoing
(FY2018). Hence, we cannot estimate the impact of the crisis and the MoU
measures on health care outcomes, especially in chronic diseases24 and transmis-
sible diseases.24,25,26 However, we can study the impact of those measures on
access to health care services, as well as on efficiency and quality of providers.
Regarding access to health care services, the increase of moderating fees
resulted in a diminishing of health care services provided by the NHS, given
the decreasing demand for health care (in line with the law of supply and
demand). For instance, the number of general medical appointments in primary
care decreased by 2.5% within FY2011–FY2015, despite the increase of citizens
enrolled by a general practitioner (GP). In that period, the number of patients per
GP increased from 1,550 to 1,900, mainly due to the reduction of the workforce.
In terms of secondary health care (hospitals), emergencies decreased by 4.6%,
whereas surgeries and specialty appointments increased by 6.4% and 8.4%,
respectively. This is in line with the objective of reducing low complexity urgencies
handled by hospitals and transferring them to the primary care centers, as they
should be the first point of contact between the citizen and the NHS.
Barros and colleagues27 analyzed the impact of the financial crisis on demand
for health care and health care services by the Portuguese citizens aged above
15 years old. According to those authors, 15.1% of interviewed citizens could
not purchase some or all compulsory medicines. Additionally, 8.7% of citizens
did not search for a medical appointment due to the lack of financial resources,
and 5% (resp. 6%) missed the scheduled appointment because they had no
money for transportation (resp. they did not want to lose a salary day).
According to Sakellarides and colleagues,28 the change of co-payments could
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have been more equitable if they would be adjusted by the family income rather
than by the services’ prices.
Positive outcomes were observed in terms of efficiency of drugs delivery and
pharmaceutical products’ usage and related expenses.29 Indeed, there was a
reduction ofe668 million of those expenditures between FY2011 and
FY2012.30,31 The average price of drugs supplied in ambulatory services decreased
from e15.19 toe12.21 between FY2011 and FY2015.32 Furthermore, generic
drugs increased their market share from 36.2% to 47.0% in the same period.33
In contrast, budgetary cuts of e200 million in the hospitals’ funding between
FY2011 and FY2012 did not result in efficiency gains. Instead, both technological
and infrastructural investments were clearly missed.15 Changes in public admin-
istration, including cuts in wages and overtime payments, had a significant impact
on clinical staff. Evidence suggests an increased emigration of young physicians
and nurses, hasty retirements, and migration of clinical staff from the public to
the private sector.10
Recently, Correia and colleagues34 analyzed the effects of the financial crisis
on health and health care, using 3,442 inquiries to physicians working within the
Portuguese NHS. Results suggest improvements in efficiency and effectiveness,
without endangering quality of delivered care. Nevertheless, the authors con-
cluded that such efficiency improvements could result from recurring material
shortage in public institutions and a larger pressure to reduce provision care-
related expenses, including prescribed medication. In fact, there was a refusal to
introduce innovative treatments in several providers, a lack of compulsory drugs
for inpatients, and the ending of some therapies.
An Econometric Analysis
To complement and corroborate the previous analysis, we apply some econo-
metric models to a set of Portuguese public hospitals. These models determine
whether the Portuguese public hospitals have improved their performance over
the period of 4 years, FY2013–FY2016. This period corresponds to the last
3 years associated with the troika agreement period and the first year after exter-
nal intervention. It should be noticed that this period was considered because of
data availability. Also, the measures introduced by MoU have likely some late
effects that would be observed also in FY2016, i.e., after intervention.
To study the evolution of hospitals performance in the considered period, we
used a directional-based Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), alongside the
Hicks-Moorsteen (HM) productivity index.35 The HM can be decomposed
into several indexes: efficiency spread change (ES), productivity gap (PG),
scale efficiency evolution (SEE), and change of consumed resources, delivered
services, and (un)desirable variables related to quality. Details are as follows.
DEA computes optimal targets for inefficient hospitals based on the linear
combination of the Pareto-efficient ones. These targets are, then, used to
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compute the augmented Hicks-Moorsteen Index (HM) as proposed by Ferreira
and Marques.35 The HM is a true total factor productivity index (TFPI), in
opposition to the widely spread Malmquist index, which is a TFPI if (and only
if) the production technology globally exhibits constant returns to scale, i.e.,
hospitals are assumed to be in their own optimal scale. This assumption is,
however, doubtful in practice. The HM index does not make this assumption,
it can couple all inefficiency sources because it is based on targets rather than
the distances to the empirical efficient frontier, and it is indefinitely decompos-
able and multiplicatively complete.35 In short, it is multiplicatively decomposed
into an efficiency spread index, ES, a productivity gap index, PG, and a
scale economies exploitation index, SEE. Meanwhile, the PG index can be
decomposable into as many indexes as the number of groups of variables:
inputs, DX , outputs, DY, desirable process variables, DD, and undesirable pro-
cess variables, DU.
Consider 2 moments of time, t and s, such that s > t. Gains (or losses)
of productivity over that period, D ¼ s t > 0, are measured by HMts >1 (or
<1). Since
HMts ¼ ESts  PGts  SEEts ¼ ESts  DX ts  DYts  DDts  DU ts  SEEts
productivity improvements result from (i) efficiency gains, ESts > 1, (ii) approaches
to the optimal scale, SEEts > 1, (iii) reduction of resources consumption by bench-
marks, DX ts > 1, (iv) increasing of delivered services by benchmarks, DYts > 1, (v)
improvement of desirable process variables of care, DDts > 1, and (vi) improve-
ment of undesirable variables, DU ts > 1. Mathematical details can be found in
Ferreira and Marques.35
Data were provided by the official source of the Ministry of Health (http://
benchmarking.acss.min-saude.pt/) and included variables classified as consumed
resources (inputs), delivered services (outputs), quality of care (appropriateness
and safety), and access (timeliness). We used these data to construct 4 nonpara-
metric piecewise linear frontiers, one for each year from FY2013 to FY2016,
using DEA. Based on data availability, we considered the following variables:
1. Inputs
• Staff costs, X1 – expenses with doctors, nurses, and other staff, either clinical
or not, and excluding outsourcing
• Operating costs, X2 – operational costs excluding staff, outsourcing, and
costs of goods sold and consumed
• Costs of goods sold and consumed, X3 – expenses with drugs and clini-
cal material
• Costs with outsourcing, X4, including external labor
• Beds, X5 – total beds occupied within a year in nurseries
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• Doctors, X6 – full-time equivalent (FTE) number of doctors
• Nurses, X7 – FTE number of nurses
• Hospital days, X8 – total number of days spent by all inpatients, as time is a
resource that should be consumed.
2. Outputs (desirable)
• Inpatient discharges, Y1, adjusted by the inpatient Case-Mix Index (CMI)
• Emergency cases, Y2, adjusted by the medical CMI
• First medical appointments, Y3, adjusted by the medical CMI
• Follow-up medical appointments, Y4, adjusted by the medical CMI
• Outpatient (minor) surgeries, Y5, adjusted by the medical CMI
• Conventional (major) surgeries, Y6, adjusted by the surgical CMI
• Urgent surgeries, Y7, adjusted by the surgical CMI
• Number of births, Y8
3. Desirable variables of process of care (extra desirable outputs)
• Outpatient surgeries per potential outpatient procedure, D1, as minor sur-
geries should be favored (for the sake of resources exploitation efficiency),
particularly whenever it is the most appropriate scenario for the patient
• Rate of hip surgeries on elderly, in the first 48 hours after hip fracture, D2 – it
measures how timely the health care provider is and how safe the eldest
inpatients are from potential hazardous events following delayed surgeries
• Rate of first medical appointments within the maximum ensured (legislated)
response time per first medical appointment, D3, as a measure of timeliness
and barrier to access to secondary health care providers (because outpatients
enter this level of care by referral or by emergency)
4. Undesirable variables of process of care (extra undesirable outputs)
• Rate of decubitus ulcers in bedridden, U1
• Rate of pulmonary embolism and deep vein thrombosis, U2
• Rate of postoperative septicemia, U3
• Rate of in-hospital death rates for low severity levels, U4
• Rate of readmissions within 30 days after discharge, U5
• Inpatients staying more than 30 days in the inpatient services, U6
• Rate of caesarean sections per delivery, U7
• Rate of caesarean sections on term cephalic presentations, U8
• Rate of vaginal deliveries after caesarean sections, U9
Portugal is a small country, thus with only a few public hospitals. Even
though, several mergers have occurred in the past few years, narrowing down
the number of secondary health care providers. On the one hand, we considered
only the singular hospitals and the hospital centers (horizontally merged enti-
ties). On the other hand, we excluded local health units (LHU), public-private
partnerships (PPP), and specialized hospitals, such as oncology centers and
psychiatric hospitals. LHUs result from the vertical integration of a hospital
and some primary care centers, and publicly available data regards the entire
Nunes et al. 13
structure. Including these entities in a benchmarking exercise would certainly
introduce unfair comparisons. PPPs are not forced to publish their expenditures.
Given the lack of data for these entities, we opted to remove them from our
dataset as well. Finally, highly differentiated hospitals have a production tech-
nology that is totally different from the undifferentiated health care providers.
This means that including the former hospitals in the analysis would likely pro-
duce efficient frontiers that do not translate the true production frontier. In
other words, these hospitals are not directly comparable with the undifferenti-
ated ones. By these reasons, our sample contains 108 undifferentiated hospitals
and hospital centers homogenously distributed across the 4 years of analysis. No
outlier was detected, even after a super-efficiency analysis.
We had as many variables as hospitals in the sample. Meanwhile, nonpara-
metric models have a dimensionality problem related to the number of the
variables and the sample’s size. In other words, the results’ resolution is lost
when there are too many variables when compared to the number of hospitals in
the dataset. Past evidence suggests that the number of hospitals should be, at
least, 3 times the number of variables. Since it is not possible to increase the
number of hospitals in the dataset, we used Principal Component Analysis
(PCA). It is a widely spread technique that narrows down the number of var-
iables, with no significant loss of information, and simultaneously removes
redundant information arising, for instance, from highly correlated variables.
Therefore, after standardizing variables by dividing them by their standard
deviation (r), we applied PCA to the inputs, X ¼ PCA X
r Xð Þ
 
, to the outputs,
Y ¼ PCA Y
r Yð Þ
 
, to the desirable process variables, D ¼ PCA X
r Xð Þ
 
, and to the
undesirable process variables, U ¼ PCA U
r Uð Þ
 
. These new variables (first com-
ponent of each PCA) can explain, at least, 88% of the sample’s original vari-
ability, after redundancy removal. In other words, these 4 new variables are very
good proxies of hospitals behavior in terms of resources consumption, volume
of delivered services, quality of care, and access to the appropriate and
timely care.
When we applied those 4 variables to both the DEA and the HM index, we
obtained the overall productivity evolution of Portuguese public hospitals, as
well as the decomposed indexes supporting that evolution. Routines were
developed in MatlabVR . Evidence is presented in Figure 2. Ninety-five percent
confidence intervals are represented as “whiskers.” If those intervals contain the
unit, then the index is not significantly different from 1 (in the statistical sense),
i.e., neither improvement nor worsening of productivity can be detected.
According to our results, there was a slightly decrease of productivity within
the period FY2013–FY2014 (HM2013/2014 <1), with a recovery in the next tri-
ennium (HM2014/2015HM2015/2016 >1). Overall, there was a small productivity
increase between FY2013 and FY2016 because HM2013/2016¼HM2013/2014
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HM2014/2015HM2015/2016> 1. This is not the result of efficiency changes, as
ESts1 for t; s ¼ 2013; . . . ; 2016; t 6¼ s. In other words, there was no efficiency
change of hospitals during the considered period. Mathematically, the relative
position of hospitals regarding the annual efficient frontier did not significantly
change during the considered period. Furthermore, the productivity change was
negatively influenced by the decreasing of the scale economies exploitation: see
index SEE, which is smaller than 1 between FY2013 and FY2015, and not
different from 1 in the last biennium – thus, SEE2013/2016< 1. Currently, hospi-
tals are farther from the optimal scale than they were before FY2013 because
SEE¼ SEE2013/2014SEE2014/2015 SEE2015/2016 is globally smaller than 1. That
is, since FY2013, hospitals have repeatedly lost their capacity of exploiting
scale economies.
In view of that, the productivity change within FY2013–FY2016 resulted from
improvements on the technology, because PGts was significantly larger than 1, at
least between FY2013 and FY2015 (PG2013/2014 and PG2014/2015 larger than 1).
The first biennium was marked by the reduction of consumed resources
(DX2013/2014> 1), perhaps resulting from the financial crisis, without substantial
changes in delivered services (DY2013/2014 1) or improvements in terms of unde-
sirable dimensions of care (DU2013/2014 1). Meanwhile, the performance of hos-
pitals in terms of desirable dimensions was significantly improved in that
biennium (DD2013/2014> 1). Similar trends were observed regarding the period
Figure 2. Productivity evolution of Portuguese public hospitals, FY2013–FY2016.
Source: authors.
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FY2014–FY2015, although a considerable growth of provided services was
observed (DY2014/2015> 1). This means that one can motivate reduction of
expenses without worsening the delivery of health care services and their quality.
Finally, the efficient frontier between FY2015 and FY2016 did not shift, moti-
vated by an increase of resources consumption which seems to be associated with
an improvement of quality of the delivered services. Since the position of hospitals
regarding the annual frontier did not change (ES2013/2014ES2014/2015 ES2015/
2016 1), and this frontier significantly and positively shifted during the consid-
ered period (PG> 1 between FY2013 and FY2015 and PG¼ 1 between FY2015
and FY2016), then the overall performance of hospitals increased and hospitals
from FY2016 outperform their counterparts from FY2013.
Current Policies to Retrieve the National Health Service
The policy redefinition following the financial crisis was a wasted opportunity
to implement reforms to induce access, quality, and efficiency in the Portuguese
NHS. Indeed, as suggested by our econometric analysis, no meaningful perfor-
mance improvement was achieved for hospitals within the period FY2013–
FY2015. Additionally, the Portuguese Observatory on Health Systems did
warn the government of the need to promote a strategic plan to predict the
side effects of such a crisis in the primary care sector. That plan would include
a better and stronger integration with other health care providers and other care
levels, including the secondary one.36 Nonetheless, the suggestion was not heeded.
In FY2016, the current Ministry of Health concluded that the crisis not only
did not solved but also worsened some problems existing in the NHS, including
Figure 3. Main strategies of the current government to retrieve the NHS (FY2016 onwards).
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the loss of responsiveness to health care demand, the lack of investments, and
the increased barriers to access.37 For this reason, a new 4-year strategy
(FY2016–FY2019) was implemented to reform the NHS. It is summarized
in Figure 3. First, this strategy aimed to improve the responsiveness to
citizens – greater elasticity in primary health care with the introduction of med-
ical tests such as routine laboratory exams, X-rays, electrocardiography, oral
health examinations, and visual health tests. Secondly, the access of citizens to
the appropriate and timely care had to be enhanced. To do so, barriers to access
had to be mitigated, e.g., by reducing waiting lists and waiting times for medical
appointments and emergencies and by ameliorating the integration and articu-
lation between different levels of care and between different entities delivering
the same care level. Thirdly, the supply of continuous and palliative care had to
be extended. For such a purpose, new vacancies in integrated care were created;
referral processes were dematerialized; home-based and ambulatory care were
promoted; mental health and palliative care component were strengthened; and
the concept of informal caregiver was introduced. Furthermore, in line with the
government’s strategy during the troika agreement period, the efficiency
and effectiveness of the use of NHS resources had to be increased. For example,
improving the accountability, defining new terms of reference in contracts,
and creating an NHS-based transparency portal were 3 components of
that strategy.37
In terms of public health promotion, some tactics have been implemented to
induce healthier life styles (in line with the National Health Plan) (see Figure 4).
For instance, a Health Literacy National Program was created in FY2016 to
identify, validate, support, and progressively disseminate good practices in
both health literacy and self-care. A program to control and to mitigate
infectious diseases, epidemics, and multi-drug resistant infections was also intro-
duced, alongside some preventive measures against the tobacco consumption,
e.g., anti-tobacco drug reimbursement and tobacco restriction measures in
public places.37
Figure 4. Summary of the main strategies undertaken for public health (FY2016 onwards).
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To reduce inequities on access to health care, the services responsiveness has
been improved by reducing co-payments, by increasing the number of citizens
exempt from them (e.g., firefighters and donors of blood or organs), and by
providing free (home-to-health care provider and vice versa) transportation for
deprived citizens.38
The customers’ opinion and satisfaction are also a major concern of the current
government. The more satisfied the patient is, the expectedly better will be the
outcomes of care. Therefore, implementing systems that control for the (dis)sat-
isfaction of users and identify priority areas is a compulsory measure. For
instance, Ferreira and colleagues39 extended and applied a linear programming
tool, known as MUSA (Multicriteria Satisfaction Analysis) to identify the priory
areas to improve the satisfaction of outpatients seen in the medical appointments’
service. Those authors proposed multiple strategies, but the critical one is, as
expected, to reduce waiting times. Moreover, past experiences may dictate
future demand: a dissatisfied patient is unlikely to demand future care from the
same provider. Therefore, citizens are now free to choose where they want to be
treated,40 according to a referral system. Given the current financing system, the
citizens’ free choice is likely to induce quality enhancements of delivered care.
Primary health care is a priority in the annual strategy of the Ministry of
Health. In FY2015, nearly a 10th of all Portuguese citizens had no designated
GP. In FY2016, this scenario changed for half a million Portuguese citizens.
Furthermore, oral and ophthalmic care were integrated into the primary care
level (pilot projects). Additional family health units were created.38 In the short
run (FY2018 and FY2019), one may expect that all citizens should have a
designated GP. Moreover, oral and ophthalmic care services should be extended
to the entire Portuguese mainland, and investments should be made to recover
degraded infrastructures and to update technology.37
The management, valorization, and motivation of human resources is anoth-
er priority area of this strategy. By December FY2017, NHS hired more than
5,800 health professionals. The role of health professionals and their responsi-
bilities were valued. In short, the clinical staff admission process was simplified,
and some incentives for the geographical mobility of doctors and nurses to
deprived regions were introduced to reduce access disproportions.41
As part of the overall improvement of NHS governance, the current policy
aims to reinforce efficient management strategies in management contracts by
introducing incentives. The current health policy also intends to improve trans-
parency, as well as the timely disclosure of information regarding the performance
of the NHS. In this sense, hospitals gain special relevance as does the drug indus-
try. At the level of hospital management, one should promote and reward the
most efficient hospitals and should develop a process of sharing resources between
providers, such that patients are referred to other hospital units that are willing to
receive them. Thus, waiting lists for consultation or surgery may be shortened.42
For the future, the Ministry of Health plans to investment in new equipment, to
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build new hospital PPPs, and to increase patient referrals to complementary diag-
nostic facilities and therapeutic services.41
About improving services quality in terms of their timeliness and appropri-
ateness, the development of good practices and patient safety is one of the
priorities, avoiding cases of complications and deaths arising from poor provi-
sion. Preventive plans have already been implemented to monitor quality in the
NHS by an extensive list of performance indicators, like the one used in section
5 and by Ferreira and Marques.49
Another priority challenge is the commitment to information and communi-
cation systems that monitor the performance of the NHS providers and promote
the sharing of the patients’ clinical process among all health care providers.
Additional areas of focus are the fight against fraud and corruption in prescrip-
tions, the reduction of charges in the private sector, the sustainability of cost
reduction through a centralized purchasing process, and the investment in high-
end equipment differentiation to replace the existing ones.
Conclusions
The financial, economic, and social crisis in Portugal forced the government to
reduce public financing, particularly in the health sector, through a set of meas-
ures included within an MoU. These measures promoted, on the one hand, the
rationalization of resources.43–45 On the other hand, these measures have
increased the barriers to access to health care, as well as divestments in equip-
ment and infrastructures. In addition, the crisis had indirect effects on the health
of the population by reducing disposable household’s income.
As for the effects on the health status of the Portuguese citizens, there are
no concrete evaluations, on the one hand, because the economic downturn is
still very recent, and, on the other hand, because the government has not
implemented yet a system to monitor the impact of austerity in the popula-
tion’s health status. Furthermore, evidence-based monitoring should have
been developed to address the negative effects, especially, in the most vulner-
able groups.
Since FY2016, the country has recovered financially, through the deficit
reduction, unemployment decreasing, and investment in health care increas-
ing, hiring of human resources, and rehabilitation of infrastructures
and equipment.
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